Linux security is a rather contentious topic. While this article isn’t about whether Linux is secure overall, it tackles some widely spread myths and misconceptions about the ecosystem.

Most package maintainers can’t code

This myth is based on the assumption that a package maintainer’s skillset extends as far as packaging, no more, no less. The reality is that package maintainers often have a modicum of coding skill in order to analyze security flaws of applications and write patches that cannot or have not been merged upstream yet.

Some packages like Firefox or PipeWire are maintained by those who have software engineering experience (both are RedHat employees, but Martin Stransky for example contributes directly to the Firefox codebase).

Package managers are an unnecessary and insecure middleman

The perception by many users is that package managers simply are wrappers around applications and are unnecessary when you could get it directly from the developer instead. However, I think this description fits more for download sites (which simply distribute and repackage executables) but package maintainers do more than simply redistribute binaries.

Fedora for example requires first-party packages to be built on Fedora infrastructure. The source code is taken, any necessary patches applied, distro specific configure flags are passed and the subsequent binary is built on the infrastructure. On the other hand, binaries from developers are typically either built on the developer machine or on some third party infrastructure (like GitHub, Azure and so forth). While the general idea is that users tend to trust downloading directly from the developers instead of a middleman, the middleman is simply a different party.

There have been many instances of supply chain compromises from careless developers not enabling 2FA, committing API secrets to their repository or GitHub vulnerabilities for example, but by building the code on Fedora’s infrastructure, this is bypassed entirely.

Michał Górny has blog posts tackling this topic in The modern packager’s security nightmare and Why not rely on app developer to handle security?.

Is Flatpak a good compromise?

Flatpak apps are built against a common runtime rather than arbitrary dependencies so this is similar to traditional package management. Similarly, Flatpaks are built using the distro’s infrastructure (Fedora in the case of their registry, Flathub in the case of a third party registry). However, there is one downside.

App developers are essentially given control over what permissions their app does or doesn’t need. In theory this makes sense, as the app developer may know what works best for their app. In practice, many weaken the sandbox to avoid bug reports or due to lack of understanding of the Linux ecosystem in general may use the broadest permissions available.

Flatpaks that are simply wrappers around proprietary apps (like Discord) cannot for example prevent telemetry or would require weakening the sandbox for essential features. Ironically, it is more secure to run Discord in a browser where you have a full spectrum blocker (like UBlock Origin) and the website sandboxing features of your browser.